Criticism of Benacerraf's criticism of modern eleatics by Leon, Antonio
CRITICISM OF BENACERRAF’S
CRITICISM OF MODERN ELEATICS
Antonio Leon Sanchez
I.E.S Francisco Salinas, Salamanca, Spain
http://www.interciencia.es
aleon@interciencia.es
Abstract. I analyze here Benacerraf’s criticism of Thomson ar-
guments on the impossibility of ω-supertasks. Although Benac-
erraf’s criticism is well founded, his analysis of Thomson’s lamp
is incomplete. In fact, it is possible to consider a new line of ar-
gument, which Benacerraf only incidentally considered, based on
the functioning laws of the lamp. This argument leads to a con-
tradictory result that compromises the formal consistency of the
ω-ordering involved in all ω-supertasks.
1. Introduction
As is well known, to performs an ω-supertask means to perform an ω-
ordered sequence of actions (tasks) in a finite interval of time [29], [7],
[8], [24]. Supertasks are useful theoretical devices for the philosophy
of mathematics [[5], [31], [24]], particularly for the formal discussion
of certain problems related to infinity. Although their physical possi-
bilities and implications have also been discussed ([19], [20], [24], [26],
[13], [15], [14] ([20], [21], [22], [12], [23], [18], [2], [3], [25] [31], [16], [10],
[11], [18], [9], [27]. Probably was Gregory the first in proposing how a
supertask could be accomplished ([17], p. 53):
If God can endlessly add a cubic foot to a stone -which
He can- then He can create an infinitely big stone. For
He need only add one cubic foot at some time, another
half an hour later, another a quarter of an hour later
than that, and son on ad infinitum. He would then have
before Him an infinite stone at the end of the hour.
But the term ”supertask” was introduced by J. F. Thomson in his
seminal paper [29] of 1954 . Thomson’s paper was motivated by Black’s
argument on the inconsistency of performing infinitely many actions
[6], and the rejections of Black’s argument by R. Taylor [28] and J.
Watling [30]. In his paper Thomson tried to prove the impossibility
of such supertasks. Thomson argument was, in turns, criticized in
other seminal paper, in this case by P. Benacerraf [4]. Benacerraf’s
successful criticism finally motivated the foundation of a new infinitist
theory: supertask theory.
1
2 Criticism of Benacerraf’s criticism of modern eleatics
The basic idea of Benacerraf’s criticism against Thomson argument
is the impossibility of deriving any formal consequence on the final
state of a supermachine from the ω-ordered succession of states the
machine traverses along a supertask. But, as we will see, Benacerraf’s
analysis of Thomson’s lamp is incomplete. In fact, if supertasks do not
change the nature of the world, Thomson’s argument can be reoriented
in order to consider the very nature of the theoretical devices that
perform supertasks; a nature which is independent of the number of
performed actions and that, consequently, remains before, during and
after any supertask.
2. Thomson’s Lamp
As Thomson did in 1954, in the following discussion we will deal with
one of these ([29], p. 5):
... reading-lamps that have a button in the base. If the
lamp is off and you press the button the lamp goes on,
and if the lamp is on and you press the button the lump
goes off.
It will be referred to as Thomson’s Lamp (TL). Assume now that TL’s
button is pressed at each one of the countably many instants ti of any
ω-ordered sequence of instants 〈ti〉i∈N defined within any finite half-
closed interval of time [ta, tb), for instance the classical one defined in
accordance with:
ti = ta + (tb − ta)
i∑
k=1
1
2k
, ∀i ∈ N (1)
whose limit is tb. In these conditions, at tb TL will have completed an
ω-ordered sequence of switchings 〈si〉i∈N, i.e. a supertask. Thomson
tried to derive a contradiction from this supertask by speculating on
the final state of the lamp at instant tb in terms of the succession of
the performed switchings along the supertask ([29], p. 5):
[The lamp] cannot be on, because I did nor ever turn
it on without at once turning it off. It cannot be off,
because I did in the first place turn it on, and thereafter
I never turned off without at once turning it on. But the
lamp must be either on or off. This is a contradiction.
Benacerraf criticized this argument as follows: ([4], p. 768):
The only reasons Thomson gives for supposing that his
lamp will not be off at ta are ones which hold only for
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times before tb. The explanation is quite simply that
Thomson’s instructions do not cover the state of the
lamp at tb, although they do tell us what will be its
state at every instant between ta and tb (including ta).
Certainly, the lamp must be on or off (provided that it
hasn’t gone up in a metaphysical puff of smoke in the
interval), but nothing we are told implies which is to be.
The arguments to the effect that it can’t be either just
have no bearing on the case. To suppose that they do
is to suppose that a description of the physical state of
the lamp at tb (with respect to the property of being of
on or off ) is a logical consequence of a description of its
state (with respect to the same property) at times prior
to tb.
(ta and tb appears respectively as t0 and t1 in Benacer-
raf’s paper)
In short, the problem possed by Thomson is not sufficiently described
since no constraints have been placed on what happens at tb [1].
3. Criticism of Benacerraf criticism
In the discussion that follows, I will develop a new argument exclusively
based on the theoretical definition of Thomson lamp: a reading-lamp
that has ”a button in the base such that if the lamp is off and you
press the button the lamp goes on, and if the lamp is on and you press
the button the lump goes off ”. According to Benacerraf ([4], p.770):
”But [at tb]the lamp must be either on or off” is striking
by it obvious irrelevance.
and ([4], p. 768):
... Certainly, the lamp must be on or off [at tb],...
which, in fact, has nothing to do with the number of performed switch-
ings but on the nature of the lamp stated in its theoretical definition.
The discussion that follows will also be exclusively based on that theo-
retical definition, particularly on the successiveness of its functioning,
i.e. on the fact that TL can successively, but not simultaneously, be
turned on and off.
Consider then a (theoretical) Thomson lamp TL. In order to avoid
unnecessary discussions we will assume that it is permanently powered
by its appropriate theoretical fuel. I will symbolize the functioning and
states of TL in accordance with the following simple conventions:
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• ON [t] denotes that TL is on at instant t, while ON(ta, tb)
means that TL is on along the real interval (ta, tb); the same
applies to all closed and half closed real intervals.
• OFF [t] denotes that TL is off at instant t, while OFF (ta, tb)
means that TL is off along the real interval (ta, tb); the same
applies to all closed and half closed real intervals.
• P [t]ON denotes that TL’s button has been pressed down just at
instant t so that the lamp is turned on. P (ta, tb)
ON means that,
at least one time in the real interval (ta, tb), TL’s button has
been pressed down being the lamp turned on; the same applies
to all closed and half closed real intervals.
• P [t]OFF and P (ta, tb)
OFF means the same as P [t]ON and P (ta, tb)
ON
respectively, except the lump results off.
We can now express some elementary TL’s laws. All of them exclusively
derived from its functioning, which is explicitly stated in its definition,
as well as from the strict successiveness of its two states (on and off ).
For instance:
• PON [t] ⇒ ON [t]
• POFF [t] ⇒ OFF [t]
• ¬ON(←, t) = OFF (←, t)1
• ON [t, →)⇒ ¬POFF [t, →)
• OFF [t, →)⇒ ¬PON [t, →)
• OFF (←, t) ∧ON [t]⇒ PON [t]
• POFF [t, →) ⇒ ¬ON [t, →)
• POFF (←, t] ⇒ ∃t′ ≤ t : OFF [t′]
• etc.
Although it is so elementary as the above ones, we will prove now the
following functioning law:
POFF (←, t) ∧ON [t, →)⇒ ∃t′ ≤ t : PON [t′] ∧ ¬POFF [t′, →) (2)
denoting that if TL has been turned off at least one time before t,
symbolically POFF (←, t), and it is on from t on, in symbols ON [t, →),
then there must exist an instant t′ equal or less than t at which the
lamp is turned on being no longer turned off: PON [t′]∧¬POFF [t′, →)).
Proof. Assume first that:
¬∃t′ ≤ t : PON [t′] (3)
which means that TL has not been turned on at t′, for any t′ equal or
less than t, that is to say:
¬PON(←, t] (4)
1As usual, (←, t) is the interval of all real numbers less than t; similarly [t, →)
is the interval of all reals equal or greater than t.
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On the other hand, and according to the first term of the antecedent
of (2), TL has been turned off at least one time before t, accordingly
we can write:
POFF (←, t) ⇒ ∃t′′ < t : OFF [t′′] (5)
and from (5) and (4):
OFF [t′′] ∧ ¬PON(←, t] ⇒ OFF [t] (6)
But:
OFF [t] ⇒ ¬ON [t, ←) (7)
and ¬ON [t, ←) goes against the antecedent of (2). Assumption (3) is
therefore impossible.
Now assume that:
¬∃t′ ≤ t : ¬POFF [t′, →) (8)
This implies that:
∀t′ ≤ t : POFF [t′, →) (9)
Therefore:
POFF [t, →) (10)
And then:
¬ON [t, →) (11)
which also goes against the antecedent of (2). We can therefore state
that if:
POFF (←, t) ∧ON [t, →) (12)
then
∃t′ ≤ t : PON [t′] ∧ ¬POFF [t′, →) (13)

A symmetrical argument would prove that:
PON(←, t) ∧OFF [t, →)⇒ ∃t′ ≤ t : POFF [t′] ∧ ¬PON [t′, →) (14)
We can now reconsider the possibility of performing a supertask with
Thomson lamp TL. For this, assume that at each instant ti of 〈ti〉i∈N
defined according to (1), and only an them, TL’s button is pressed
down so that it is successively turned on and off. At tb, the limit of
the ω-ordered sequence 〈ti〉i∈N, a supertask will have been performed.
According to Benacerraf, at tb the lamp will be either on or off. This
conclusion does not depend on the number of performed switchings but
on being a Thomson lamp with only two states, on and off, that can
successively but non simultaneously be exhibited. Assume that, once
completed the supertask, the lamp is on (a similar argument could be
applied if it were off ). If no other action is performed with the lamp,
we can write:
POFF (←, tb) ∧ON [tb, →) (15)
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denoting that TL has been turned off at least one time before tb (first
term of (15)) and that it remains on just from tb on (second term of
(15)). Now then, law (2) states2:
POFF (←, tb) ∧ON [tb, →)⇒ ∃t
′ ≤ tb : P
ON [t′] ∧ ¬POFF [t′, →)
As we have repeatedly said, this law does not depend on the (finite or
infinite) number of performed switchings but on being a Thomson lamp
(a theoretical object rightfully defined). Consequently, it must hold
before, during and after any supertask. We will prove now, however,
that it does not hold in the case of our supertask. In fact, let us prove
that no t′ in the real interval [ta, tb] satisfies law (2). According to this
law it must hold:
∃t′ ≤ tb : P
ON [t′] ∧ ¬POFF [t′, →) (16)
On the one hand, t′ cannot be equal to tb because at tb no switch
is performed, otherwise we would have an (ω + 1)-ordered sequence
of switchings (a super-duper-task in Benacerraf’s words) rather than
an ω-ordered one. On the other, it cannot be less than tb because
at any instant prior to tb, whatsoever it be, only a finite number of
switchings has been performed and infinitely many of them remains
still to be performed3. Thus, no t′ in the real interval [ta, tb] satisfies
PON [t′] ∧ ¬POFF [t′, →) and then basic law (2). Notice this is not an
indeterminacy but an impossibility: no real number within [ta, tb] satis-
fies the required condition. The only way of performing our supertask
with Thomson lamp is, therefore, by violating its own laws of func-
tioning. Our supertask, and then that of Thomson, is in fact formally
impossible.
It would be immediate to prove that if in the place of an ω-ordered
sequence of switchings only a finite number n of them were performed,
law (2) (or in its case law (14)) always holds. The reason is a simple
one: in all finite cases there is always a last switching performed at the
precise instant tn (in the case of n switchings, each performed at the
precise instant ti of the finite sequence 〈ti〉1≤i≤n) defining the instant
t′ of laws (2) and (14). We can therefore conclude that for any n in N,
to perform n switchings with TL is a consistent performance, while to
perform an ω-ordered sequence of them is not. This seems to indicate
that being complete and uncompletable4, could be not only an abuse of
language but a formal inconsistency derived from the first transfinite
ordinal, which in turn derives from assuming the existence of infinite
sets as completed totalities (Axiom of Infinity).
2If TL were off at tb we would have to consider law (14) instead of law (2).
3This unaesthetic and immense asymmetry is invariably forgotten in supertask
literature.
4ω-ordered sequences have to be complete infinite totalities (as the actual in-
finity requires) although no last element completes them.
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